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December 15, 2011   
 
The Honorable Harry Reid 
Majority Leader 
United States Senate  
 
The Honorable Max Baucus  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance  
United States Senate  
 
The Honorable Tom Harkin 
Chairman  
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions  
United States Senate  
 
Subject: Health Care Coverage: Job Lock and the Potential Impact of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act 
 
The majority of Americans—about 55 percent in 2010—rely on employer-sponsored health 
care coverage, which is largely subsidized by most employers and thus less costly to 
employees than coverage purchased by individuals on their own.1 Although a valued 
employee benefit, many believe that having health coverage tied to employment can 
influence workers to stay in jobs they might otherwise leave, a phenomenon generally 
known as “job lock.” The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), enacted in 
2010,2
 
 includes provisions that are designed to increase the accessibility and affordability of 
health coverage, particularly for individuals with preexisting health conditions.  PPACA 
implementation is phased; though some provisions went into effect during the year of 
enactment, many provisions are scheduled to take effect in 2014. Some suggest that one 
benefit of PPACA may be a decrease in the occurrence of job lock. You asked us to 
examine job lock and the specific ways PPACA may affect it.  Accordingly, we examined two 
key questions:  
1. What has research shown about whether and the extent to which workers stay in 
jobs they might otherwise leave out of fear of losing health care coverage and the 
impact of those decisions on the labor market? 
2. What are expert views on the ability of PPACA to mitigate job lock? 
                     
1DeNavas-Walt, Carmen, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith, U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Reports, P60-239, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 
2010 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: 2011). 
 
2Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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To answer the first question, we conducted a systematic literature review of articles 
published in the United States in the last 10 years. We included studies published in 
a journal with a peer review process or by an independent research organization. To 
be included in our review, studies must have had empirically-based findings on 
whether or the extent to which employer-sponsored health coverage influences 
workers’ decisions to stay in a job and/or the impact of these decisions on the 
national economy or labor market.3 In addition, we reviewed the studies for 
methodological soundness for the purposes of our report.4
 
 We identified 31 studies 
that met our criteria.  (See enc. I for these studies). 
To answer the second question, we reviewed published summaries of the law5 and 
obtained input from the Department of Health and Human Services and the 
Congressional Research Service to initially identify potential areas of impact of 
PPACA, how those potential areas of impact, if realized, could affect job lock, and 
the specific PPACA provisions most likely to influence job lock.6
 
 We then used this 
information as a basis for discussions with multiple experts that conduct research 
and analysis on health coverage and labor market issues, including organizations 
that represent key health care reform stakeholders and a range of perspectives. 
(See enc. II for a list of the experts we interviewed.)  During these interviews, we 
solicited views on the potential of PPACA to affect job lock overall and the role 
specific provisions of the law may play.  The goal of the interviews was to assess 
expert views on the potential of PPACA to affect job lock; we did not attempt to more 
generally assess the labor market or other economic implications of the law.  A list of 
the specific provisions in PPACA identified through this methodology as potentially 
affecting job lock is found in enclosure III.  The views presented are not those of 
GAO and are not necessarily shared by all the experts we interviewed, nor by the 
organizations that the experts represent. 
We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through December 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
                     
3We searched multiple bibliographic databases, including ProQuest, EconLit, PubMed, PolicyFile, and 
Academic OneFile, as well as a number of social science and medical databases using the Dialog 
platform.  
 
4These studies differ in the data used, populations studied, and the empirical models used.  In order 
to empirically isolate job lock, the studies use a variety of model specifications to control for factors 
other than health insurance that might influence worker mobility.  Depending on the data used, these 
control variables include age, education, industry, occupation, alternative health coverage, health 
status, and family size. 
 
5See for example, Congressional Research Service, Private Health Insurance Provisions in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, R40942 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2010).   
 
6We did not attempt to independently identify or analyze all PPACA provisions that may potentially 
affect job lock, but instead addressed selected provisions that were referenced in the summaries we 
reviewed. 
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Background 
Economic theory generally suggests that worker mobility—workers’ ability to move 
between jobs or in and out of the labor market—enables workers to obtain 
employment where they are most productive, which in turn promotes efficiencies in 
the labor market and provides benefits to the overall economy.  Worker mobility can 
be affected by numerous factors, including wages offered and job availability, 
education and career interests, personal priorities and family situations, or the value 
that individuals place on benefits provided by different employers. Health coverage 
provided by a worker’s employer can be one factor in such mobility decisions. “Job 
lock” is the term used to describe the concept of workers staying in jobs they might 
otherwise leave for fear of losing access to affordable health coverage. By definition, 
job lock, to the extent that it exists, is considered a negative phenomenon for an 
individual worker because it keeps them from making their preferred labor mobility 
choice, such as to change jobs, start a business, reduce work hours, or exit the labor 
force to stay home with children or retire.  
 
A majority of Americans rely on private insurance for health care coverage. This 
includes employer-sponsored coverage as well as coverage purchased directly by 
individuals.  In 2010, 55 percent of Americans received health coverage through 
employer-sponsored group health plans purchased or funded by their employers and 
an additional 10 percent of Americans received coverage through health coverage 
purchased directly from health issuers in the individual market.7  Employers offer 
health coverage in part as a benefit to attract employees and most employees 
participate in employer-sponsored coverage when it is available.8 Compared to large 
employers, small employers are less likely to offer their employees health coverage, 
citing the cost of coverage as a key reason.9  Group and individual market coverage 
differ in several ways, including how premiums are calculated and whether 
application denials are permitted. For example, while premiums for employer-
sponsored coverage are not permitted under federal law to vary for similarly situated 
employees based on health status,10
                     
7Another 31 percent of Americans received coverage through public programs like Medicare and 
Medicaid, and about 12 percent were uninsured. Percentages do not sum to 100 because estimates 
of coverage types are not mutually exclusive and individuals can have more than one type of 
coverage during the year.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2010 (Washington, D.C.: 2011).  
 premiums for individual health coverage in 
many states usually do depend on this factor and may thus vary substantially from 
individual to individual. Furthermore, employers generally subsidize the majority— 
 
8M.W. Stanton and M.K. Rutherford, Employer-sponsored health insurance: trends in cost and 
access, a report prepared for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Research in Action 
Issue 17, AHRQ Pub. No. 04-0085 (Rockville, Md.: 2004).  
 
9In 2011, almost all (99 percent) of large employers (those with 200 or more workers) offered health 
coverage, compared to 59 percent of small employers (those with between 3 and 199 workers).  In 
the small employer category, 48 percent of the smallest employers (those with between 3 and 9 
workers) offered health coverage. See Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Education 
Trust, Employer Health Benefits 2011 Annual Survey (Menlo Park, Calif., and Chicago, Ill.: 2011).  
 
1029 U.S.C. § 1152(b); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b). 
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more than 70 percent on average in 2011—of the premium costs,11 while those with 
individual market coverage are responsible for the full cost of premiums. As a result, 
the employee share of premiums for employer-sponsored coverage tends to be less 
costly than overall premiums for individual market coverage. Group and individual 
market coverage also differs with respect to application denials. Under federal law, 
individuals enrolling in group health plans are protected from being denied 
enrollment because of their health status.12 However, currently in the individual 
market of many states, some individuals who apply for health coverage can have 
their applications denied for eligibility reasons or as a result of their health status, 
such as having a preexisting health condition.13
PPACA contains a number of provisions that may make health coverage more 
accessible and affordable, as well as encourage employers to offer health coverage. 
Regarding access, for example, PPACA reforms the individual health insurance 
market in 2014 by prohibiting issuers from denying coverage due to health status, 
and by establishing Affordable Insurance  Exchanges in states through which 
individuals can compare and select standardized health coverage offered by 
participating issuers.
  
 
14
                     
11In 2011, employers contributed about 82 percent of the average annual premium ($5,429) for single 
coverage, i.e. coverage for the worker alone and 72 percent of the average annual premium 
($15,073) for family coverage.. See Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Education 
Trust, Employer Health Benefits 2011 Annual Survey, (Menlo Park, Calif., and Chicago, Ill.: 2011).  
  Regarding affordability, PPACA expands Medicaid eligibility, 
establishes tax credits and cost-sharing reductions for coverage in the new  
 
 
12See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a).  PPACA extends this prohibition to all individuals in the individual 
market beginning on or after January 1, 2014. Currently, issuers cannot deny coverage to children 
under 19 because of pre existing conditions. Pub. L. No. 111-142, §§ 1201(4), 10103(e), 124 Stat. 
156, 895. 
 
13According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, as of January 2011, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, and Vermont have guaranteed issue requirements that prohibit any insurer from 
denying coverage to an individual based on their current medical conditions or risk of poor health. An 
additional seven states have guaranteed issue requirements that only apply to certain insurance 
plans or during limited times of the year. Washington State requires insurers to guarantee issue 
coverage to certain individual market applicants based on a health status questionnaire. The 
remaining applicants are offered coverage through the state's high-risk pool, which provides coverage 
for individuals who—due to a preexisting health condition—have been denied enrollment or are 
charged higher premiums in the individual market. 
 
14Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1201(4), 1311(b), 124 Stat. 155, 173. Although PPACA requires each state 
to establish an “American Health Benefit Exchange,” CMS refers to such an Exchange as an 
Affordable Insurance Exchange.  Accordingly, throughout this draft we refer to such Exchanges as 
Affordable Insurance Exchanges. 
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Affordable Insurance Exchanges, and prohibits issuers from charging higher 
premiums because of preexisting conditions or medical history.15,16
Results in Brief 
 PPACA also 
contains provisions that may encourage employers to offer health coverage, 
including (1) tax credits for small businesses beginning in 2010, (2) financial 
penalties for applicable large employers who do not offer minimum essential 
coverage and have at least one full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit in 
an Exchange plan starting in 2014, (3) the establishment of small business 
Exchanges in 2014 that small businesses can use to purchase health coverage, and 
(4) the requirement that individuals—subject to certain exceptions—obtain health 
coverage or pay a financial penalty.  (See enc. III for more details on PPACA 
provisions that may affect job lock). 
 
Empirical research generally indicates that certain types of workers are more likely 
to remain in jobs they would otherwise leave in order to keep their employer-
sponsored health care coverage, although research does not allow for a definitive 
answer on the prevalence or implications of this phenomenon for the overall labor 
market.  The studies we reviewed generally found those workers who rely on their 
employer-sponsored health benefits are less likely to change jobs, leave the labor 
market, become self-employed, or retire when eligible, compared to those who have 
access to alternative sources of coverage. For example, one study found men with 
employer coverage were about 23 percent less likely to leave a job compared to 
those who also had access to coverage through a spouse.17
 
 In addition, some 
research found that this job lock phenomenon may be particularly acute for 
individuals with certain preexisting health conditions.  However, because the study 
results and approaches used differ widely, it is difficult to quantify the overall 
prevalence of job lock based on those results. For example, the research examines 
a wide range of different populations and uses various definitions of job lock.  
Regarding labor market impact, the research we reviewed provides little empirical 
basis for assessing the aggregate labor market implications of job lock. This may not 
be surprising given the difficulty of designing research to address the variant ways 
job lock can affect different populations and account for the direct and indirect ways 
job lock could affect the labor market and economy. 
                     
15Between 2010 and 2013, PPACA provides states with an option to expand Medicaid eligibility to 
certain individuals with incomes of up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level, and in 2014 the 
expansion of Medicaid eligibility becomes required. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001(a), 10201(b), 124 
Stat. 271, 274, 918. It also provides, in 2014, for tax credits and cost-sharing reductions to reduce 
premium and out-of-pocket costs for individuals enrolled in Exchange plans. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 
1401, 1402, 1412, 124 Stat. 213, 220, 231. 
 
16In 2014, PPACA will require that premiums for health coverage in the individual and small group 
markets be based on rules that will allow premiums to vary based on only age, whether coverage is 
provided for an individual or family, geography, and tobacco usage. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201(4), 
124 Stat. 155.  Under these rules, considered a form of adjusted community rating, health coverage 
issuers will not be permitted to vary premiums based on the health status of applicants.  
 
17Scott J. Adams, “Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Job Change,” Contemporary Economic 
Policy, vol. 22, no. 3 (July 2004): 357-369. 
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The experts we interviewed generally agreed that expanded access to health 
coverage under PPACA may help mitigate job lock, but had differing views or were 
less certain about other possible effects of the law on job lock. They generally 
agreed that to the extent that PPACA expands access to health coverage for certain 
individuals, it may help mitigate job lock. This access may help mitigate job lock for 
individuals who leave employer-sponsored coverage and seek coverage in the 
individual market—particularly for those with preexisting health conditions. Many 
experts cited specific PPACA provisions related to expanded access that had 
potential to mitigate job lock, such as select PPACA insurance market reforms which 
will require health plans offering group and individual coverage to accept applicants 
regardless of health status and the establishment of Affordable Insurance 
Exchanges. Regarding other possible effects of the law, experts generally agreed 
that PPACA’s impact on premiums and employer willingness to offer coverage had 
job lock implications, but were less certain of or had differing views about whether 
PPACA would decrease premiums or encourage more employers to offer coverage, 
and thus were less certain about their likely impact on job lock.      
 
Research Suggests Workers Are More Likely to Stay in Jobs Due to Their Employer-
Sponsored Health Coverage, yet Prevalence and Labor Market Impact Are Uncertain   
Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage Can Influence Workers to Remain in Jobs They 
Might Otherwise Leave  
Studies published in the last 10 years generally indicate that employer-sponsored 
coverage can influence certain workers to remain in jobs they might otherwise leave. 
Of the 31 studies we reviewed, 29 presented evidence consistent with job-lock.18 
While their estimates of job lock varied, studies generally found that workers with 
employer-sponsored coverage are less likely to change jobs, become self-employed, 
exit the labor market or retire than workers who are not dependent on their employer 
for coverage (see enc. I for key findings from the studies we reviewed).19 Workers 
not dependent upon their employment for coverage would include those with 
coverage through a spouse, or access to public insurance or retiree health 
coverage.  Multiple studies found married individuals who relied on their own 
employer-sponsored health coverage were less likely to leave a job compared to 
those who had alternative access to health care through their spouse.  For example, 
one study found men with employer coverage were about 23 percent less likely to 
leave a job compared to those who also had access to coverage through a 
spouse.20
                     
18The two other studies presented evidence that differences in mobility based on employer-sponsored 
coverage could be the result of other factors, such as the positive effects of health coverage on health 
status. 
 Other studies found workers without access to public coverage were less 
likely to leave a job than those who had such coverage.  For instance, one study 
 
19A 2002 review of the literature published in the preceding decade found that the literature from that 
decade also generally indicated that heath coverage can influence workers to remain in jobs they 
might otherwise leave. See Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance, Labor 
Supply, and Job Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, Working Paper 8817, National Bureau of 
Economic Research (2002).  
  
20Adams, “Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Job Change.”  
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found that low-income fathers with employer-sponsored coverage were 5 to 6 
percent less likely to leave their job before their children became eligible for public 
coverage under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). 21 Finally, 
several studies also found older workers nearing retirement age were less likely to 
retire before the age of 65 if they lacked retiree health coverage.22  For example, one 
study found workers who had retiree health benefits were 29 to 55 percent more 
likely to retire than those who did not.23
 
  
In addition, a subset of the research looked at job lock among workers with health 
conditions.  These studies consistently found that after a health diagnosis, workers 
with employer-sponsored coverage were less likely to leave a job or reduce their 
hours compared to workers who were not reliant on their employer for health 
coverage. One study found with a newly diagnosed illness, men with employer-
sponsored coverage had a 20 percent higher probability of staying in a job 
compared to men who have coverage through a spouse.24 Another found employer 
coverage reduced the propensity of individuals with chronic illness to quit by 41 
percent for men and 39 percent for women compared to those who do not rely on 
their employer for coverage.25  Findings from a few studies also suggest that job lock 
may be more acute for people with health conditions. For example, one study found 
that while workers with employer-sponsored health coverage were less likely than 
those without employer coverage to leave the labor force, reduce hours, or change 
jobs, these differences were particularly striking for cancer survivors.26
 
  
 
 
 
 
                     
21Cynthia Bansak and Steven Raphael, “The State Children's Health Insurance Program and Job 
Mobility: Identifying Job Lock Among Working Parents in Near-Poor Households,” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, vol. 61, no.4 (July 2008). SCHIP was established pursuant to federal law in 
1997 and offers health insurance for children in low-income families that do not qualify for Medicaid. 
See, Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901(a), 111 Stat. 251, 552.  
  
22At age 65, individuals become eligible for Medicare. If workers retire before 65 and do not have 
access to retiree health insurance, they may lack or have greater difficulty obtaining insurance 
between the age of retirement and 65.  
 
23James Marton and Stephen A. Woodbury, Retiree Health Benefit Coverage and Retirement, The 
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 470 (August 2006). 
 
24Cathy J. Bradley, David Neumark, and Meryl I. Motika, The Effects of Health Shocks on 
Employment and Health Insurance: The Role of Employer-Provided Health Insurance, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17223 (2011). 
 
25Kevin T. Stroupe, Eleanor D. Kinney, and Thomas J. J. Kniesner, “Chronic Illness and Health 
Insurance-related Job Lock,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 20, no. 3 (2001): 525-
544. 
 
26K. Tunceli, P.F. Short, J.R. Moran, and O. Tunceli, “Cancer Survivorship, Health Insurance, and 
Employment Transitions among Older Workers,” Inquiry, 46 (2009): 17-42. 
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The Overall Prevalence and Labor Market Impact of Workers Staying in Jobs Due to 
the Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage Is Unclear Due to a Variety of Factors 
While the research may be helpful in confirming the presence of job lock, it is less 
helpful in illustrating the overall prevalence or labor market impact of job lock. 
Because the study results and approaches used differ widely, it is difficult to quantify 
the overall prevalence of job lock based on those results. For example, even though 
the studies controlled for key factors that could influence workers’ decisions 
regarding whether to stay or leave a job, the variation in the job lock estimates 
reported in the individual studies indicate that such decisions will differ depending on 
the characteristics of the population studied. Such differences make it difficult to 
estimate how job lock would manifest itself on an aggregate level. Additionally, the 
differences in approaches used mean the findings may not be comparable or 
generalizable, and therefore do not lend themselves to definitive conclusions about 
the overall prevalence of job lock. For example, the studies use several different 
national datasets, as well as city-based datasets, or surveys conducted to collect 
specific data.27
Secondly, because the studies draw on data from different decades, spanning from 
the 1980s to 2008, it is not clear the extent to which their findings reflect how 
legislative or economic changes during this time span may have affected the 
prevalence of job lock.  On the one hand, certain events may have reduced job lock. 
For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
 Likewise, the study populations vary widely, ranging from women 
newly diagnosed with breast cancer, to low-income working fathers, to U.S. 
taxpayers.  Furthermore, studies use various definitions and variables to measure 
the job lock phenomenon, such as job tenure or job separation. Yet others use a 
change in state or federal law, such as health care reforms or public assistance 
programs, as an indicator of alternative health care coverage to measure the 
existence of job lock. Such differences in approaches across the studies we 
reviewed may explain the wide variation in the key findings and estimates identified 
by these studies (as presented in enc. I).   
28
                     
27As shown in enc. I, the datasets vary widely from the Current Population Survey, a nationwide 
survey of 60,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census to gather information on labor 
force characteristics of the U.S. population, to a registry of individuals diagnosed with cancer in the 
Detroit metropolitan area. 
 set 
new minimum standards for portability of health coverage and may have increased 
workers’ willingness to change jobs by prohibiting employers from excluding eligible 
employees from participation in the health plan and by restricting the ability to 
impose waiting periods for coverage of preexisting health conditions.  Additionally, 
the decline in employer-sponsored health coverage over time may have weakened 
the link between employment and health benefits for some individuals, thereby 
reducing workers’ hesitance to leave their jobs.  On the other hand, other events 
may have led to an increased incidence of job lock.  For example, the dramatic 
increases in the cost of health care coverage over the last decade may have made 
workers less willing to leave jobs that provide coverage.  In general, economic 
downturns may make it harder to distinguish the impact of the provision of health 
coverage from other factors that keep people in their jobs, such as fewer available 
jobs and the need to provide income in a family where a spouse has lost their job. 
 
28Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
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Finally, while economic theory generally suggests that reduced labor market mobility 
(such as that caused by job lock) can decrease potential gains in productivity and 
income, and adversely affect worker satisfaction,29 the research we reviewed 
provides little empirical basis for assessing the aggregate labor market impact of job 
lock.30  This may not be surprising given the difficulty of designing research to 
address the variant ways job lock can affect different populations and account for the 
direct and indirect ways job lock could affect the labor market and economy. A few of 
the studies, while not generalizable, provided a glimpse of some of the ways in 
which job lock can directly influence the labor market.  For instance, one study found 
that men with family health problems and employer coverage, but no spousal 
coverage, were one-third less likely to start a business compared to all men with 
employer coverage in the study sample.31 Another study projected that labor force 
participation would be greater (74.5 percent) for men aged 55 to 59 without retiree 
coverage than for men with retiree coverage (65.8 percent).32
Experts Generally Agreed That Expanded Access to Health Coverage under PPACA 
May Mitigate Job Lock, but Had Differing Views or Were Less Certain about Other 
Possible Effects of the Law on Job Lock  
  However, these 
studies did not attempt to explore the more indirect or aggregate impact of job lock 
on the labor market, such as the effect of these actions on job growth or productivity. 
Expanded Access to Health Coverage for Workers with Preexisting Health Conditions 
under PPACA Could Help Mitigate Job Lock  
The experts we interviewed generally agreed that to the extent PPACA expands 
access to health coverage for certain individuals, it may help mitigate job lock.33
                     
29Alan C. Monheit and Philip F. Cooper, “Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory and Evidence,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 48, no. 1 (October 1994). 
 In 
2014, PPACA will provide broad access to individual market coverage at premium 
rates that may not vary based on the health status of an applicant. This access may 
help mitigate job lock for workers leaving their employer-sponsored coverage and 
seeking individual market coverage—particularly those with a preexisting health 
condition. For example, older workers with preexisting health conditions may choose 
 
30While we did not find any empirical studies that have estimated the overall implications of job lock 
on the national economy, we found two estimates of the aggregate impact of job lock on the economy 
using computations based on simplifying assumptions that, if changed, could indicate a different 
impact of job lock.  One of these analyses in 2002 concluded that the cost of job lock to the economy 
was less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product. See Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C. Madrian, 
Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, Working Paper 
8817, National Bureau of Economic Research (2002). The other piece found that the cost was about 
1 percent of wages and about 0.2 percent of GDP in 2009. See Executive Office of the President, 
Council of Economic Advisers, The Economic Case for Health Care Reform (June 2009). 
31Robert W. Fairlie, Kanika Kapur, and Susan Gates, “Is Employer-Based Health Insurance a Barrier 
to Entrepreneurship?” Journal of Health Economics ,30 (2011): 146-162. 
 
32David M. Blau and Donna B. Gilleskie, “Retiree Health Insurance and Labor Force Behavior of 
Older Men in the 1990s,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 83, no.1 (February 2001): 64-
80. 
 
33See enc. III for additional information about specific PPACA provisions. 
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to retire early and obtain coverage through an individual market health plan,34
Many experts cited specific provisions of PPACA as having potential to contribute to 
this job lock outcome. These include select PPACA insurance market reforms, to be 
fully implemented in 2014, which will require health plans offering group and 
individual coverage to accept all applicants regardless of health status and will 
prohibit these health plans from charging higher premiums because of preexisting 
conditions or medical history. Another provision that was cited as having potential to 
mitigate job lock is the establishment of Affordable Insurance Exchanges through 
which eligible individuals and small employers can compare and select coverage 
among multiple competing health plans. 
 or 
employed individuals with a preexisting condition may choose to start a business 
and thus need to obtain coverage from the individual market.  Currently, such 
workers may remain in a job due to fear of relying on the individual insurance 
market, where they could be subject to application denials or higher premiums in 
certain circumstances. 
 
Uncertain or Varied Effects of PPACA on Premiums and Employer-Sponsored 
Coverage Suggest an Uncertain Effect on Job Lock  
The experts we interviewed generally agreed that the affordability of premiums for 
health coverage could have job lock implications, but cited uncertain or mixed effects 
of PPACA on premiums, and thus on job lock.  Coverage available from the 
individual market is generally more expensive than employee contributions to 
employer-sponsored coverage and may be less comprehensive than coverage 
available from an employer, and this may cause job lock for some individuals.35
• Premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions available under PPACA may 
reduce premium and other health care costs in the individual market for some 
low-wage individuals.
  
Some experts said some provisions of PPACA may reduce premiums or other out-
of-pocket costs for these individuals, while others will affect different people 
differently, and still other provisions may increase costs.  For example: 
36
                     
34Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update (August 2010).  
  
 
35Employers that offer health coverage typically pay a large share of their employees’ health coverage 
premiums. This employer contribution generally makes employer-sponsored coverage more 
affordable than coverage obtained in the individual market, where individuals pay the full premium 
amount themselves, regardless of health status. Under PPACA, individuals that obtain coverage in 
the individual insurance market (including in Exchanges) will continue to pay the full cost of their 
premiums unless they qualify for a premium credit. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that in 
2021, 20 million of the 24 million enrollees in Affordable Insurance Exchanges will be receiving 
premium tax credits. See Congressional Budget Office, Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation 
Enacted in March 2010 (Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2011). However, PPACA prohibits health plans 
and issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from denying coverage or charging 
higher premiums because of preexisting conditions or medical history. 
 
36Some experts also noted that the PPACA provider payment reform provisions intended to reduce 
long-term health care cost growth, such as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation and the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board, have the potential to reduce premium costs over the long 
term.  
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• Expanded Medicaid eligibility under PPACA may reduce the costs of health 
coverage for those who are eligible.  
• Adjusted community rating requirements in the individual and small group 
markets under PPACA are likely to have different effects for different aged 
individuals. Notably, younger individuals may pay higher premiums, while older 
individuals may pay less than they otherwise would have. 
• Other PPACA provisions—such as the essential health benefits package 
requirements that will specify a minimum, standardized level of benefits to be 
included in all qualified health plans—could result in an increase in premiums.37
The experts we interviewed generally agreed that the availability of employer-
sponsored health coverage could have job lock implications, but were uncertain or 
had differing views on the effect PPACA may have on employers’ willingness to offer 
coverage and on job lock. Some experts noted that to the extent PPACA 
encourages more employers to offer health coverage, job lock may be mitigated 
because fewer workers would face the possibility of moving to an employer that 
does not offer health coverage.  However, experts had a wide range of views about 
what effect PPACA would have on the extent to which employers offer coverage.  
Experts’ views on specific PPACA provisions that may encourage employers to offer 
health coverage illustrate this uncertainty.  For example, some experts said the 
following: 
 
•  Small business tax credits may provide a financial incentive for some employers 
to offer coverage; however, they are limited in value and temporary. In addition, 
the availability of subsidized coverage for eligible individuals in the Exchanges 
could encourage some small employers to stop offering coverage.   
• The impact of the PPACA penalty on certain employers that do not offer health 
coverage may be limited because most large employers currently offer coverage, 
and those that do not may find the penalties to be less costly than providing 
coverage. Other large employers that already offer coverage may choose to 
discontinue it and pay the penalty, especially if they find it less burdensome 
administratively to drop coverage or less costly to pay the penalty.  
Experts also generally agreed that, if instead, PPACA reduces the likelihood that 
employers offer health coverage, job lock could also be mitigated because 
employment and health coverage would no longer be linked for certain workers. For 
example, workers whose current employers choose to stop offering coverage after 
PPACA implementation may be less job locked because retaining health coverage 
will not be a factor influencing these workers to remain in their current jobs. 
See enclosure IV for additional details on expert views on the likelihood that PPACA 
will mitigate job lock. 
 
                     
37The PPACA essential benefits package may ensure that health coverage available in the individual 
and small group markets will have the same scope of benefits as available under a typical employer 
plan. Those with individual market coverage have generally paid a higher share of their health costs 
out of pocket than those with employer-sponsored group coverage. Therefore, according to some 
experts, although more comprehensive benefits under the essential health benefits requirement may 
increase premiums, it is also possible that the requirement could result in lower out-of-pocket costs 
for some. 
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Agency Comments 
We provided a draft of this letter to the Departments of Health and Human Services 
and Labor for review and comment. Each agency provided technical comments 
which we incorporated as appropriate. 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
the Secretary of Labor, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the 
report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or 
your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact Andrew Sherrill at 
(202) 512-7215 or sherrilla@gao.gov or John E. Dicken at (202) 512-7114 or 
dickenj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff members who 
made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure V. 
 
Andrew Sherrill  
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security  
 
John E. Dicken 
Director, Health Care 
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Enclosure I 
Literature Examining Job Lock38
 
 
Table 1: Studies Examining Influence of Employer Health Coverage on 
Decision to Stay or Change Jobs 
Study Dataset/ 
years 
studied 
Population 
studied 
Findings 
consistent 
with job 
lock? 
Key findings 
Adams, Scott J. “Employer-
Provided Health Insurance and 
Job Change.” Contemporary 
Economic Policy, vol. 22, no. 3 
(July 2004): 357-369. 
March 
Current 
Population 
Survey 
(CPS); 1988-
2000 
Married 
men, aged 
25-55  
Yes Study found evidence that employer-
sponsored health coverage lowers 
mobility—specifically, a reduction in 
mobility of 22.5 percent for those 
without alternative coverage.    
Bansak, Cynthia and Steven 
Raphael. “The State Children's 
Health Insurance Program and 
Job Mobility: Identifying Job 
Lock Among Working Parents 
in Near-Poor Households.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, vol. 61, no.4 (July 
2008). 
Survey of 
Income and 
Program 
Participation 
(SIPP); 1996 
and 2001  
Working 
fathers 
Yes Study found that after the introduction 
of the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP), married 
men who had eligible children 
(because they were low-income) and 
whose wives did not have coverage 
from their own employers were 5-6 
percent more likely to separate from 
their current employer compared to 
before the introduction of SCHIP.     
Berger, Mark C., Dan A. Black, 
and Frank A. Scott. “Is There 
Job Lock? Evidence from the 
Pre-HIPAA Era.” Southern 
Economic Journal, vol. 70, no.4 
(2004): 953-976. 
SIPP; 1987 
and 1990  
All SIPP 
respondents 
No Study found no statistically significant 
evidence of job lock, including no 
statistically significant increases in 
employment duration or decreases in 
wages for those with employer-
sponsored health coverage and with 
health problems in the family as, 
according to the study, would be 
expected if job lock was pervasive.  
Dey, Matthew S. and 
Christopher J. Flinn. “An 
Equilibrium Model of Health 
Insurance Provision and Wage 
Determination.” Econometrica, 
vol. 73, no. 2 (March 2005): 
571-627. 
SIPP; 1996 White males 
between 25 
and 54 with 
a high 
school 
education 
No Study found employer-sponsored 
health coverage did not lead to serious 
inefficiencies in job mobility.  According 
to the study, existence of job lock in 
other studies could be because people 
without insurance are more likely to 
experience negative health events and 
leave employment. 
Gilleskie, Donna B. and Byron 
F. Lutz. “The Impact of 
Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance on Dynamic 
Employment Transitions.” The 
Journal of Human Resources, 
vol.37, no.1 (Winter 2002): 129-
162. 
NLSY79; 
1989-1993 
Males aged 
24-35 
Yes Study found evidence that employer-
sponsored health coverage reduces 
mobility by 10 to 15 percent for young 
unmarried males, consistent with job 
lock.  No evidence among young 
married males.   
Kapur, Kanika. “Labor Market 
Implications of State Small 
Group Health Insurance 
Reform.” Public Finance 
Review, vol. 31, no. 6 
March CPS; 
1991-99  
Individuals 
aged 18-64, 
who have 
health 
insurance  
Yes Study found some evidence suggesting 
that state ratings reforms, which 
prohibits setting premium based on 
health status, increased job mobility for 
individuals with family health issues, 
                     
38We have defined job lock as a phenomenon that occurs when workers stay in jobs they might otherwise leave 
out of fear of losing their health care coverage. The studies included in this review are limited to those with 
empirically-based findings and published from 2001 to 2011 in a journal with a peer-review process or by an 
independent research organization. 
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(November 2003): 571-600. but decreased job mobility for older 
workers.  Study suggests that state 
portability reforms increased job 
mobility. However, overall results 
suggest that the effects of the full 
package of reforms are likely to be 
small.   
Kim, Jaewhan and Peter 
Philips. “Health Insurance and 
Worker Retention in the 
Construction Industry.” Journal 
of Labor Research, vol. 31, no.1 
(February 2010): 20-38. 
SIPP; 1996 
and 2001  
Union and 
nonunion 
full-time 
construction 
workers  
Yes Study found union health coverage that 
was portable in the construction 
industry increased the probability of 
worker retention in the industry 
between 30 and 41 percent compared 
to 13-18 percent for nonunion, 
nonportable employer-sponsored 
health coverage.  Portable health 
coverage in the construction industry 
results in industry lock but not job lock.   
Okunade, Albert A. and 
Phanindra V. Wunnava. 
“Availability of Health Insurance 
and Gender Differences in 'Job-
Lock' Behavior; Evidence From 
NLSY.” Journal of Forensic 
Economics, vol. 15, no.2 
(2002): 195-204. 
NLSY79; 
1996 
Whites; 
males and 
females who 
worked for 
pay in the 
nonagricul-
tural, private 
sector 
Yes Study found women with employer-
sponsored health coverage had almost 
66 more weeks of tenure than women 
without. Men with employer-sponsored 
coverage had about 51.7 more weeks 
of tenure than men without. 
Olson, Craig A. “Do Workers 
Accept Lower Wages in 
Exchange for Health Benefits?” 
Journal of Labor Economics, 
vol. 20, no.2 (April 2002): S91-
S114. 
March-June 
CPS; 1990-93  
Households 
where 
husbands 
and wives 
both work, 
and wives 
work full-
time 
Yes Study found wives with their own 
employer-sponsored health coverage 
accepted a wage about 20 percent 
lower than what they would have 
received working in a job without 
benefits.   
Rashad,Inas and Eric Sarpong. 
“Employer-provided Health 
Insurance and the Incidence of 
Job Lock: A Literature Review 
and Empirical Test.” Expert 
Review of Pharmacoeconomics 
and Outcomes Research, vol. 
8, no. 6 (2008): 583-591. 
National 
Health 
Interview 
Survey 
(NHIS); 1997-
2003/ 
NLSY79;1989
-2000  
Single, 
employed 
individuals 
with some 
form of 
health 
insurance  
Yes Study found individuals with employer-
sponsored health coverage stayed on 
the job 16 percent longer and were 60 
percent less likely to voluntarily leave 
their jobs than those with coverage that 
was not provided by their employers. 
Sanz-de-Galdeano, Anna. “Job-
Lock and Public Policy: 
Clinton's Second Mandate.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (2006). 
SIPP; 1996 
Panel 
SIPP 
respondents 
aged 25-55, 
who were 
employed 
and not in 
military, 
agriculture, 
or 
construction   
Yes Study found the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA) did not significantly 
reduce job lock. HIPAA increased job 
lock for single men (3.6 percent); 
slightly reduced job lock between 2.7 
percent (single women) and 6.6 
percent (married women).  
Source: GAO. 
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Table 2: Studies Examining Influence of Employer Health Coverage on 
Decision to Become Self-Employed 
Study Dataset/ 
years 
studied 
Population 
studied 
Findings 
consistent 
with job 
lock? 
Key findings 
DeCicca, Philip.  Health 
Insurance Availability and 
Entrepreneurship. Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper 10-167 
(April 2010). 
Behavioral 
Risk Factor 
Surveillance 
System; 
1991-1996  
Survey 
respondents, 
aged 25-59  
Yes Study found New Jersey's Individual 
Health Coverage Program 
(implemented in 1993) increased self-
employment relative to four comparison 
groups by roughly 14-20 percent. For 
those with marital, smoking, or obesity 
issues, estimates are at the higher 
range of this group. 
Fairlie, Robert W., Kanika 
Kapur, and Susan Gates. “Is 
Employer-Based Health 
Insurance a Barrier to 
Entrepreneurship?” Journal of 
Health Economics, 30 (2011): 
146-162. 
March CPS; 
1996-2006 
Wage and 
salary 
workers, 
aged 25-64 
and 55-75  
 
Yes Study found men with family health 
problems and employer-sponsored 
health coverage (and without 
alternative spousal coverage) are 1 
percentage point more likely to stay in 
their current job rather than create a 
small business compared to all men 
with employer coverage in the study 
sample, for whom the business 
creation rate is 3 percent per year. In 
addition, business ownership rates 
increase from just under age 65 (pre-
Medicare eligible) to just over age 65 
(post-Medicare eligible), whereas it 
found no change in business 
ownership rates from just before to just 
after for others aged 55-75. 
Heim, Bradley T. and Ithai Z. 
Lurie. “The Effect of Self-
Employed Health Insurance 
Subsidies on Self-Employment.” 
Journal of Public Economics, 94 
(2010): 995-1007. 
 
Six year panel 
of tax return 
data; 1999-
2004 
Taxpayers Yes Study found the increase in the 
deductibility of health insurance 
premiums (due to a change in tax 
policy) for self-employed workers 
increased self-employment by 9.1 to 
14.9 percent. 
 
 
Wellington, Alison J. “Health 
Insurance Coverage and 
Entrepreneurship.” 
Contemporary Economic Policy, 
vol. 19, no. 4 (2001): 465-478. 
March CPS; 
1993 
Employed 
married 
white 
husbands 
and wives, 
aged 25-62 
Yes Study suggests having a guaranteed 
alternative source of health coverage 
increased the probability of self-
employment between 2.3 and 4.4 
percentage points for husbands and 
1.2 and 4.6 percentage points for 
wives. Findings suggest spousal (or 
universal) coverage could increase the 
percentage of self-employed in the 
workforce by 2 to 3.5 percentage 
points.  
Source: GAO. 
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Table 3: Studies Examining Influence of Employer Health Coverage on 
Decision to Reduce Work Hours or Exit the Workforce 
Study Dataset/ 
years studied 
Population 
studied 
Findings 
consistent 
with job 
lock? 
Key findings 
Bradley, Cathy J ., David 
Neumark, Zhehui Luo, and 
Heather L. Bednarek. 
“Employment-contingent Health 
Insurance, Illness, and Labor 
Supply of women: Evidence 
From Married Women with 
Breast Cancer.” Health 
Economics, 16 (2007): 719-737. 
Metropolitan 
Detroit Cancer 
Surveillance 
System; 2000-
2002 
Women 
newly 
diagnosed 
with breast 
cancer in 
Detroit , 
aged 30-64 
Yes Study found that, after diagnosis, 
women who received health coverage 
through a spouse were less likely to 
continue working compared to women 
who were dependent on their own 
employer-sponsored health coverage. 
Bradley, Cathy J., David 
Neumark, and Meryl I. Motika.  
The Effects of Health Shocks 
on Employment and Health 
Insurance: The Role of 
Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working 
Paper 17223 (2011). 
Health and 
Retirement 
Study (HRS); 
1996-2008 
 
 
 
 
Individuals 
aged less 
than 64  
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Study found that with a new adverse 
health diagnosis (not involving 
hospitalization or self-reported health 
decline), men with employer-sponsored 
health coverage had a 20 percent 
higher probability of staying in a job 
compared to men who had coverage 
through a spouse.   
 
Cebi, Merve. Employer-
Provided Health Insurance and 
Labor Supply of Married 
Women. Upjohn Institute 
Working Paper No. 11-171 
(2011). 
NLSY79; 1989-
2000; CPS; 
2000 
Married 
women, 
aged 25-64 
Yes Study found wives who were covered 
by their husband’s employer-sponsored 
health coverage were less likely to 
work than those who were not. Among 
those married women who did work, 
those with spousal coverage worked 
less than those without.  
Hamersma, Sarah and Matthew 
Kim. “The Effect of Parental 
Medicaid Expansions on Job 
Mobility.” Journal of Health 
Economics, 28 (2009): 761-770. 
SIPP; 1996-
2001 
Men and 
women, 
aged 20-54 
who were 
not self-
employed 
or receiving 
disability 
payments 
Yes Study found that expanding Medicaid 
eligibility reduced job lock for 
unmarried women. For every $100 of 
Medicaid threshold, the probability that 
an unmarried woman with employer-
sponsored health coverage would quit 
her job increased by 0.1 percentage 
point, which is about 4 percent of the 
average quit rate of the study sample. 
The change in Medicaid threshhold did 
not affect quit rates for men. 
Kapinos,Kandice A. “Changes 
in Spousal Health Insurance 
Coverage and Female Labor 
Supply Decisions.” Forum for 
Health Economics and Policy 
(2009). 
CPS; 1995-
2005 
Married 
women  
Yes Study found wives whose husbands 
had access to employer health 
coverage worked about 10 percent 
fewer hours a week than women 
without spousal coverage, and such 
wives were also less likely to work at 
all.   
Murasko, Jason E. “Married 
Women's Labor Supply and 
Spousal Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 
Results from Panel Data.” 
Journal of Family and Economic 
Issues (2008): 391-406. 
Medical 
Expenditure 
Panel Survey 
(MEPS); 1996-
2004  
Married 
women, 
aged 25-54  
Yes Study found married women worked 
about 1 hour less per week or were 7.9 
percent less likely to work when their 
husbands had health coverage.  
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Perry, Cynthia D., Genevieve 
M. Kenney, and Bogdan 
Tereshchenko. Disability Onset 
Among Working Parents: 
Earnings Drops, Compensating 
Income Sources, and Health 
Insurance Coverage. Low-
Income Working Families Paper 
11. The Urban Institute (2009). 
SIPP; 1996 
and 2001 
Employed 
individuals 
aged 25-58 
living with a 
child under 
18  
Yes Study found persons with employer-
sponsored health coverage reduced 
their work hours by about 2.7 hours a 
week at time of disability onset.  This 
compared with a reduction of 3.6 hours 
for persons with other private coverage 
and over 8 hours for persons covered 
by public coverage or without 
coverage.  
Royalty, Anne Beeson; and 
Jean M. Abraham. “Health 
Insurance and Labor Market 
Outcomes: Joint Decision-
Making within Households.” 
Journal of Public Economics, 90 
(2006): 1561-1577. 
MEPS; 1996-
1998  
Married 
households 
aged 19-64, 
in which at 
least one is 
employed 
outside the 
home 
Yes Study found workers whose spouses 
had employer-sponsored health 
coverage were less likely to have their 
own employer-sponsored health 
coverage and were also less likely to 
work full-time.  
Stroupe, Kevin T, Eleanor D. 
Kinney, and Thomas J. J. 
Kniesner. “Chronic Illness and 
Health Insurance-related Job 
Lock.” Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, vol. 
20 no. 3 (2001):  525-544. 
Phone 
interviews and 
follow-up 
mailed 
questionnaires; 
1994 
Employed 
individuals 
with chronic 
medical 
conditions 
in the family 
in Indiana   
Yes Study found having employer-
sponsored health coverage reduced 
the propensity of individuals facing a 
chronic illness to quit work by 41 
percent for men and 39 percent for 
women compared to workers who did 
not rely on their employer for coverage.  
Tunceli, K., P.F. Short, J.R. 
Moran, and O. Tunceli. “Cancer 
Survivorship, Health Insurance, 
and Employment Transitions 
among Older Workers.” Inquiry, 
46 (2009): 17-42. 
Penn State 
Cancer 
Survivor Study 
and HRS; 
1997-2002 
Workers, 
aged 55-64  
Yes Study found individuals with employer-
sponsored health coverage were less 
likely to leave the labor force, reduce 
hours, or change jobs compared to 
those without employer-sponsored 
health coverage. These differences 
were particularly striking for cancer 
survivors. 
Source: GAO. 
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Table 4: Studies Examining Influence of Employer Health Coverage on 
Decision to Retire 
Study Dataset/ 
years 
studied 
Population 
studied 
Findings 
consistent 
with job 
lock? 
Key findings 
Blau, David M. and Donna B. 
Gilleskie. “Retiree Health 
Insurance and Labor 
Force Behavior of Older Men 
in the 1990s.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 
83, no.1 (February 2001): 64-
80. 
HRS; 1992 
and 1994  
Men aged 50-
61 and their 
spouses  
Yes Study found the availability of retiree 
health coverage increases the exit rate 
from the labor force from 6.6 percent to 
8.4 percent when the worker shares the 
cost with the employer, and from 6.9 
percent to 11.2 percent if the employer 
pays the full cost. Study projected labor 
force participation for men aged 55-59 
would be 74.5 percent without retiree 
health coverage and 65.8 percent with 
retiree health coverage, and for men 
aged 60-64, labor force participation 
would be 47.1 percent without and 35.2 
percent with retiree health coverage.  
Authors state that other factors may 
have a role in these projections. 
Boyle, Melissa A. and Joanna 
N. Lahey. “Health Insurance 
and the Labor Supply 
Decisions of Older Workers: 
Evidence from a U.S. 
Department of Veterans 
Affairs Expansion.” Journal of 
Public Economics, 94  
(2010): 467-478. 
March CPS; 
1992-2002  
Male veterans 
and 
nonveterans, 
aged 55-64  
Yes Study found older workers were 
significantly more likely to decrease 
work after receiving access to non-
employer-based health coverage—
either becoming self-employed, working 
part-time or exiting the labor market, 
such as retiring. Study also suggests 
that job lock is stronger for more 
educated individuals. 
French, Eric and John Bailey 
Jones. “The Effects of Health 
Insurance and Self-Insurance 
on Retirement Behavior.” 
Econometrica, vol. 79, no. 3 
(May 2011): 693-732. 
HRS; data for 
every 2 years 
from 1992-
2006 
Male heads of 
households, 
aged 57-61 in 
1992 
 
Yes Study found the rate of job exit at 62 
would be 8.5 percentage points higher if 
all workers had health coverage that 
was not tied to working (retiree health 
coverage) before Medicare becomes 
available. 
Marton, James and Stephen 
A. Woodbury. Retiree Health 
Benefit Coverage and 
Retirement. The Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard 
College Working Paper No. 
470 (August 2006). 
HRS; 1992-
94, 1994-96 
Men born 
from 1931-41 
who were 
working full-
time in 1992  
Yes Study found workers with retiree health 
coverage were 29 to 55 percent more 
likely to retire than those without.   
Marton, James, and Stephen 
A Woodbury.  The Influence 
of Retiree Health Benefits on 
Retirement Patterns. Upjohn 
Institute Working Paper No. 
10-163 (February 2010). 
HRS; 1992-
2004 
Older male 
workers 
working full-
time 
Yes Study found retiree health coverage 
increased the probability of retirement 
for men aged 60-64 by 5-7.5 percentage 
points. There was no effect for men 
aged 50-56 and modest to no effect for 
men aged 57-59.  
Zissimopoulos, Julie M., 
Nicole Maestas, and Lynn A. 
Karoly. The Effect of 
Retirement Incentives on 
Retirement Behavior: 
Evidence From the Self-
employed in the United 
States and England.  RAND 
Working Paper WR-528 
(October 2007). 
HRS and 
English 
Longitudinal 
Survey of 
Aging; 2002 
and 2004  
Workers aged 
55 to 70 in 
2002 
Yes Study found access to non-employer 
provided health coverage (or retiree 
benefits for wage workers) in the United 
States increased the percentage of 
workers exiting the labor force at all 
ages. 
Source: GAO. 
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Enclosure II 
 
Experts Interviewed by GAO about the Ability of PPACA to Mitigate Job Lock 
 
Health care reform 
stakeholder perspective 
Organization   
Researcher American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research 
 
The Commonwealth Fund  
 
Employee Benefit Research Institute 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
 
Heritage Foundation 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
Urban Institute 
Consumer Families USA 
Federal government Congressional Research Service  
Department of Health and Human Services; Center for 
Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight and 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation  
Department of Labor; Employee Benefit and Security 
Administration, Bureau of Labor Statistics  
Insurer America’s Health Insurance Plans 
The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association 
State government National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
Unions American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO) 
Source: GAO.  
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Enclosure III 
 
Selected Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Provisions That May 
Affect Job Lock 
 
This enclosure summarizes and provides some context for selected Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provisions that may affect job lock. We 
reviewed published summaries of the law39 and obtained input from the Department 
of Health and Human Services and the Congressional Research Service to initially 
identify potential areas of impact of PPACA, how those potential areas of impact, if 
realized, could affect job lock, and the specific PPACA provisions most likely to 
influence job lock. 40 We then used this information as a basis for discussions with 
multiple experts that conduct research and analysis on health coverage and labor 
market issues, including organizations that represent key health care reform 
stakeholders and a range of perspectives. (See enc. II for a list of the experts we 
interviewed.)  During these interviews, we solicited views on the potential of PPACA 
to affect job lock overall and the role specific provisions of the law may play.  The 
goal of the interviews was to assess expert views on the potential of PPACA to 
affect job lock; we did not attempt to more generally assess the labor market or other 
economic implications of the law. The enclosure identifies three potential areas of 
impact of PPACA, and the specific PPACA provisions under each potential area of 
impact most likely to influence job lock.41
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
39See for example, Congressional Research Service, Private Health Insurance Provisions in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, R40942 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2010).   
 
40We did not attempt to independently identify or analyze all PPACA provisions that may potentially 
affect job lock, but instead addressed selected provisions that were referenced in the summaries we 
reviewed. 
 
41This assessment is based on experts’ predictions regarding the likelihood that various PPACA 
provisions may affect job lock. Given the somewhat speculative nature of this endeavor, this list may 
not be exhaustive, and it is possible that as PPACA is fully implemented, other provisions may also 
have an impact on job lock. 
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Area of Potential Impact 1:  Expand Access to Coverage, Particularly for Individuals with 
Preexisting Health Conditions 
 
Specific PPACA provisions most directly relevant to job lock, based on their potential impact 
2010 Establish a temporary, federally funded high-risk insurance pool program (the Pre-existing Condition 
Insurance Plan) for individuals who have been uninsured for more than 6 months and have a preexisting 
condition. Program ends on January 1, 2014.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 1101, 124 Stat. 119, 141 (2010). 
Prohibit health plans and issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from imposing 
any preexisting condition exclusions for children under age 19.a This prohibition will be extended to adults 
in 2014.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1201, 10103(e), 124 Stat. 154, 895. 
Require group health plans and individual market plans offering dependent coverage to continue to make 
such coverage available to unmarried children until they turn 26.b Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001(5), 124 
Stat. 130. 
2014 Prohibit health plans and issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from denying 
coverage or charging higher premiums because of preexisting conditions or medical history or from 
denying availability of coverage. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 154-156. 
Prohibit health plans and issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from imposing 
waiting periods (the time period that must pass before an individual is eligible to use health benefits) 
greater than 90 days. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 154, 161. 
Establish Affordable Insurance Exchanges (Exchanges) at the state level through which eligible 
individuals can compare, select and purchase health coverage amongst participating health plans. 
Individuals may enroll in an Exchange health plan if they are a lawful resident of the state that established 
an Exchange and are not incarcerated. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311, 1312(f), 124 Stat. 173, 183. 
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Area of Potential Impact 2:  Reduce Premiums or Out-of-Pocket Costs 
 
Specific PPACA provisions most directly relevant to job lock, based on their potential impact 
2010 From April 1, 2010, through December 31, 2013, states will have the option to expand Medicaid eligibility 
to all non-pregnant individuals under 65 years of age with incomes of up to 133 percent of the federal 
poverty level through a state plan amendment. Starting in 2014, states participating in Medicaid will be 
required to expand Medicaid eligibility to include these individuals. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001(a), 
10201(b), 124 Stat. 271, 274, 918. 
2011 Health insurers must generally spend at least 80 percent (for individual or small group market issuers) or 
85 percent (for large group market issuers) of their premium revenues for the plan year on reimbursement 
for clinical services and health care quality improvement activities or be required to issue rebates to 
enrollees.c Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1001(5), 10101(f), 124 Stat. 136, 885. 
2014 Provide advanceable, refundable tax credits to lower premium costs for individuals and families making 
between 133 and 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Level enrolled in Exchange plans. Provide cost-
sharing reductions for individuals and families making up to 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Leveld  to 
reduce out-of-pocket costs for deductibles, copayments, and other costs.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1401, 
1402, 1412, 124 Stat. 213, 220, 231(as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001, 124 Stat. 1030). 
Require all non-grandfathered individual and small group market plans to offer an essential health 
benefits package—health insurance coverage that will cover specified benefits, will not exceed specified 
cost-sharing and deductible limits, and will not impose a deductible on specified preventive services.e 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1201(4), 1302, 124 Stat. 161,163. 
Require that premiums for individual and small group health plans are based on rules that may allow 
premiums to vary based only on four specified factors: age, geography, tobacco use and whether 
coverage is provided for an individual or family.f Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201(4), 124 Stat. 155. 
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Require most individuals to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty, 
referred to as the individual mandate.  Minimum coverage includes specified government plans, an 
employer-sponsored plan, plans in the individual market, grandfathered health plans, or other coverage 
recognized by the Secretary.g Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106(b), 124 Stat. 244, 909. 
Examine alternative provider payment structures and methodologies under Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program. Several provisions attempt to encourage payment reforms and 
innovations that would reduce health care costs under these programs.h See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§§ 3021, 3022, 3403, 10320, 124 Stat. 353, 389, 395, 489, 949. 
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Area of Potential Impact 3:  Encourage Employers to Offer Health Coverage 
 
 
Specific PPACA provisions most directly relevant to job lock, based on their potential impact 
2010 Provide tax credits for eligible small businesses with fewer than 25 full-time equivalent employees and 
average annual wages below $50,000 (to be adjusted for cost-of-living after 2013). To be eligible for the 
tax credits, an employer must generally contribute at least 50 percent of the total monthly premium. From 
2010 to 2013, a tax credit of up to 35 percent of the employer's contribution to premiums is available, 
based on the number of employees and average annual wages. In 2014, the available tax credit rises to 
up to 50 percent for eligible employers that purchase health insurance through state Exchanges.  
Beginning in 2014, the tax credit is limited to 2 consecutive tax years.   Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1421, 
10105(e), 124 Stat. 237, 906. 
2014 
 
Impose financial penalties for applicable large employersi that do not offer minimum essential health 
insurance coverage to their full-time employees and have at least one full-time employee who has 
enrolled in a plan with respect to which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is 
allowed or paid with respect to the employee.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 253. 
Impose financial penalties for applicable large employers that do offer minimum essential health 
insurance coverage to their full-time employees and one or more of their full-time employees has enrolled 
in a plan with respect to which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or 
paid with respect to the employee.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 253. 
Award grants to states to establish health insurance Exchanges for small businesses (Small Business 
Health Options Program, or SHOP Exchange). The Exchanges will provide qualified small businesses 
with access to health insurers' qualified health plans and must be governmental agencies or nonprofit 
entities established by a state. Between 2014 and 2016, businesses with up to 100 employees may elect 
to make all full-time employees eligible for one or more qualified health plans offered through these 
Exchanges. Additionally, before 2016, states may elect to limit eligibility to businesses with up to 50 
employees. In 2017, states can allow businesses with more than 100 employees to elect to make all full-
time employees eligible for one or more qualified health plans in the large group market through these 
Exchanges. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1310, 1311, 1312, 124 Stat. 171, 173, 182. 
Require most individuals to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty, 
referred to as the individual mandate.j Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106(b), 124 Stat. 244, 909. 
Source: GAO analysis of PPACA. 
aSome health plan issuers sell “child only” policies, which are sold in the individual health insurance market to 
children under 19 years of age. 
bAccording to the National Conference of State Legislatures, prior to the effective date of the PPACA dependent 
coverage provision, 37 states had extended the age that dependent children could receive coverage under their 
parents’ health plans and most required that the children be unmarried and financially dependent on their 
parents. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Dependent Health Coverage (State Implementation). 
cThis is referred to as a medical loss ratio requirement. 
dCost sharing for individuals and families making 250 to 400 percent would be completely offset by a requirement 
to purchase a specified level of coverage in a qualified health plan,  See, 76 Fed, Reg. 51202, 51209, 51228 
(Aug. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(g)(1)(iii)). 
eSpecifying minimum levels of coverage may place upward pressure on premiums, but could limit exposure to 
out-of-pocket costs. 
fHealth status is not among the list of specified factors based upon which premiums may vary.  This requirement 
is considered a form of adjusted community rating. 
gDownward pressure on premiums may result if more healthy individuals are prompted to obtain health 
coverage. 
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hThese include the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Shared Savings Program, the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board, and the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. Payment models used in public 
programs are often adopted by private payers, and thus could encourage reductions in premiums and health 
care costs for employers and workers in the long term.   
iPPACA defines an applicable large employer as an employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time 
employees on business days during the preceding calendar year. 124 Stat. 254. 
jThe requirement that they have coverage may prompt employees to encourage employers to offer coverage. 
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Enclosure IV 
 
Expert Views on the Likelihood That Selected Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act Provisions Will Mitigate Job Lock 
 
This enclosure summarizes the views of experts we interviewed regarding the 
likelihood that selected PPACA provisions will mitigate job lock. The views relate to 
PPACA provisions that are organized into three potential areas of impact that, if 
realized, could mitigate job lock: expanding access to coverage; reducing premium 
or out-of-pocket costs; and encouraging employers to offer coverage. 42
 
    
Expanded Access to Health Coverage for Workers with Preexisting Health 
Conditions under PPACA Could Mitigate Job Lock 
The experts we interviewed generally agreed that to the extent PPACA expands 
access to health coverage options for workers with employer-sponsored coverage—
particularly those with preexisting health conditions—job lock may be mitigated. 
Some experts emphasized the most significant expansion of coverage options for 
individuals with preexisting health conditions will likely be in the individual health 
insurance market, where plans will be required to accept applicants regardless of 
health status.    
 
Expanding Access to Coverage, Particularly for Individuals with Preexisting 
Health Conditions 
Many experts cited the following PPACA provisions as having potential to expand 
access to health coverage for individuals with preexisting health conditions.   
• Prohibitions on denying or excluding coverage for or charging higher 
premiums because of preexisting health conditions or medical history: These 
PPACA provisions that reform the private insurance market—which would 
particularly help individuals moving from employer-sponsored group coverage 
to individual market coverage—have potential to help mitigate job lock. Unlike 
in the group and small group markets, health plan issuers in the individual 
markets of many states are currently permitted to decline applications for 
enrollment, meaning that individuals with preexisting health conditions may 
have difficulty accessing health coverage.43
                     
42Additional information about the provisions discussed in this enclosure can be found in enc. III. 
  
 
43According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, as of January 2011, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, and Vermont have guaranteed issue requirements that prohibit any insurer from 
denying coverage to an individual based on their current medical conditions or risk of poor health. An 
additional seven states have guaranteed issue requirements that only apply to certain insurance 
plans or during limited times of the year. Washington State requires insurers to guarantee issue 
coverage to certain individual market applicants based on a health status questionnaire. The 
remaining applicants are offered coverage through the state's high-risk pool, which provides coverage 
for individuals who—due to a preexisting health condition—have been denied enrollment or are 
charged higher premiums in the individual market. 
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• Affordable Insurance Exchanges: These Exchanges may expand access to 
coverage for individuals with preexisting health conditions and mitigate job 
lock.  The Exchanges may provide eligible individuals with a simplified 
process to choose plans among the multiple options available and may help 
individuals move out of employer-sponsored coverage. The Exchanges will 
likely work best in conjunction with the other insurance market reforms 
discussed above.   
The experts we interviewed were less certain about or had mixed views of the 
potential for other PPACA provisions to expand access for workers with preexisting 
health conditions and thus help mitigate job lock.   
• Pre-existing condition insurance plans (PCIPs):  While some experts 
suggested PCIPs could expand access for individuals with preexisting health 
conditions and help reduce job lock, others thought the PCIPs would have 
little or no effect.  Some experts cited as very limiting the eligibility 
requirement that individuals go without any coverage for 6 months—
something we have reported in the past that individuals with health conditions 
are reluctant to do.44
• No waiting periods greater than 90 days: While some experts said the waiting 
period restriction could expand access for individuals with preexisting health 
conditions and reduce job lock, others said it would have little effect because 
many plans, particularly employer-sponsored health plans, already have 
maximum waiting periods of 90 days or less.   
  Some experts also cited the relatively low enrollment in 
PCIPs to date.  Although the Office of the Actuary within the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) had initially projected enrollment of 
375,000 by the end of 2010, as of September 30, 2011 enrollment in the 
PCIPs totaled approximately 37,000 individuals.   
• Preexisting condition exclusion for children under 19: The children’s 
preexisting condition restriction under PPACA could help expand access for 
children with preexisting health conditions and reduce job lock. Parents could 
leave jobs that provided coverage for these conditions and still obtain 
coverage for children with such conditions in individual market plans. 
However, it was noted that this provision had unintentionally resulted in some 
individual market health plans no longer providing child-only health plans or in 
the increase of premiums.45
• Dependent coverage: Expanding dependent coverage to age 26 may not 
affect access for individuals with preexisting health conditions and thus may 
not affect job lock. According to some of the experts we interviewed, some 
  
                     
44See GAO, Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans: Program Features, Early Enrollment and 
Spending Trends, and Federal Oversight Activities, GAO-11-662 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2011).  
 
45The Congressional Research Service has noted anecdotal evidence that some health plan issuers 
have decided to no longer offer child-only policies. See Congressional Research Service, Preexisting 
Exclusion Provisions for Children and Dependent Coverage under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 2011).  
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states already require health plans to provide dependent coverage to age 26 
or close to that age threshold.46, 47
 
  
Reducing Costs Could Decrease Job Lock, though Varied or Uncertain Effects 
of PPACA on Premiums Suggest an Uncertain Effect on Job Lock 
The experts we interviewed generally agreed that reducing premiums could have job 
lock implications, but cited uncertain or mixed effects of PPACA on premiums and 
thus on job lock. They agreed with the statement that prior to full PPACA 
implementation, some individuals—particularly those that had faced higher 
premiums in the individual market because of their health status—might have 
difficulty finding affordable insurance options in the individual market if they leave the 
group health coverage offered through their employers. They generally agreed that 
to the extent premium costs or cost increases are reduced under PPACA and more 
affordable health insurance options become available for these individuals in the 
individual market, individuals may feel less compelled to remain in a current job 
primarily because it offered an affordable premium.  However, despite general 
agreement that decreased premiums could reduce job lock, experts we spoke with 
said that the likelihood that PPACA will decrease premium costs varied by provision 
or was uncertain.  
 
Reducing Premiums or Out-of-Pocket Costs 
Some experts noted that the following PPACA provisions have the potential to 
reduce premium costs. 
• Premium tax credits and out-of-pocket cost-sharing reductions: The premium 
tax credits and cost-sharing reductions may be important to reducing 
individual market premiums and other health care costs for eligible low-
income individuals. Thus the credits and cost-sharing reductions have the 
potential to reduce job lock.  Some lower-income individuals that qualify for 
the premium tax credits may leave their employer-sponsored coverage and 
use the tax credits to obtain coverage through the Exchanges, especially if 
their employers contribute a small portion of the total premium for the health 
coverage.   
• Expanded Medicaid eligibility: The Medicaid expansion may not affect job lock 
for the many newly eligible individuals that are not likely to have employer- 
                     
46According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, prior to the effective date of the PPACA 
dependent coverage provision, 37 states had extended the age that dependent children could receive 
coverage under their parents’ health plans and most required that the children be unmarried and 
financially dependent on their parents. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Dependent 
Health Coverage (State Implementation).  
 
47States regulate health insurance sold in their state, including to individuals and groups (such as 
employers), but state requirements (including dependent coverage) do not apply to coverage offered 
by employers that self-fund their health plans. 
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sponsored coverage.48
• Individual mandate: The individual mandate has the potential to reduce 
overall individual market premium costs and potentially reduce job lock to the 
extent that it increases the share of healthy individuals who obtain coverage 
in the individual market. However, the penalties for not having coverage—
particularly in the early years of the requirement—may not be large enough to 
encourage many of the youngest and healthiest people to obtain insurance 
who are needed to bring downward pressure on individual market premiums. 
To the extent the individual mandate does not reduce premium costs, job lock 
may not be mitigated. The premium tax credits and out-of-pocket cost 
reductions may similarly mitigate against adverse selection in the Exchanges, 
assuming that the tax credit population is healthy.  
  It may mitigate job jock for some low-wage individuals 
who will be able to leave those jobs and accept jobs without health coverage 
and still have health coverage under Medicaid.  Though mandatory in 2014 
for Medicaid-participating states, few states are expected to voluntarily 
expand their Medicaid programs sooner than required under this provision. 
• Provider payment reforms: PPACA payment reforms targeted toward 
reducing health care costs in federal health care programs have potential to 
eventually reduce premium costs or cost increases. For example, the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation is tasked with reducing costs for the 
Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP programs. 
Some experts said that other PPACA provisions could either have different premium 
effects for different individuals, or actually result in increases in premiums or costs 
for some. They also noted that because of the uncertain effect of these provisions on 
premiums, there was also uncertainty about their effects on job lock.   
• Adjusted community rating: The requirement that premiums for individual and 
small group plans may only vary based on specified factors that do not 
include health status is likely to have different effects for differently aged 
individuals. After implementation in 2014, older or sicker individuals may find 
reduced premiums in the individual market—thus mitigating job lock for this 
segment of the workforce—while younger or healthier individuals may face 
higher premiums.   
• Minimum essential benefits: The minimum essential benefits requirement 
could result in premium increases for some individual market plans, as the 
benefits required to be covered will likely be more extensive than what many 
individual market plans currently offer.49
                     
48Under the PPACA Medicaid expansion, low-income individuals would receive subsidized health 
coverage through the Medicaid program with little or no premiums or cost-sharing expenses—thus 
likely reducing costs for these newly eligible individuals. 
  In part because the Department of 
Health and Human Services has not finalized guidance on the essential 
benefits requirement, there is uncertainty about the ultimate effects of this 
provision.  
 
49However, the more extensive benefits—more comparable to what group plans offer—may also limit 
individuals’ exposure to out-of-pocket costs under the plans.   
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• Medical loss ratio: The effects of this provision on premium costs and job lock 
are uncertain. Some experts said that the provision may decrease premiums. 
On the other hand, some experts said this provision may actually increase 
premium costs if health plans simply pay out more in claims as a means of 
reducing the ratio between administrative and medical care costs. We 
recently reported that several health plans planned to reduce the increase in 
premiums, among other actions that included decreasing commissions to 
brokers, in order to meet the ratio requirements. One health plan said it may 
reduce expenses on retrospective utilization review programs in order to meet 
the ratio requirements.50
 
   
Differing Views or Uncertainty in Predicting Effects of PPACA on Encouraging 
Employers to Offer Coverage Suggest an Uncertain Effect on Job lock 
The experts we interviewed generally agreed that the availability of employer-
sponsored health coverage could have job lock implications. Some experts noted 
that to the extent PPACA encourages more employers to offer health coverage, job 
lock may be mitigated because fewer individuals would face the possibility of moving 
to an employer that did not offer it. However, experts either had differing views of 
PPACA’s potential effect on employer offer rates, or expressed uncertainty in 
predicting such effects.51
 
 Should a drop in offer rates occur, it may be seen among 
small employers.  Experts generally agreed that even if PPACA reduces the 
likelihood that employers offered health coverage, job lock could also be mitigated 
for certain individuals because employment and health coverage would no longer be 
linked. For example, individuals whose current employers choose to stop offering 
coverage after PPACA implementation may be less job locked because retaining 
health coverage will not be a factor influencing these individuals to remain in their 
current jobs.  
Encouraging Employers to Offer Health Coverage 
Experts’ views on specific PPACA provisions illustrate these differing views and 
uncertainty. For example, some experts said that:  
• Financial penalties: PPACA financial penalties for certain employers that do 
not offer coverage may encourage some employers to provide coverage and 
reduce job lock. However, the impact of the PPACA penalty on employers not 
offering coverage may be limited because most large employers currently 
                     
50See GAO, Private Health Insurance: Early Experiences Implementing New Medical Loss Ratio Requirements,  
GAO-11-711 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011).  
 
51There are varying estimates of the effect that PPACA will have on employer-sponsored coverage. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 2014, there would be an increase of 6 million 
nonelderly individuals with employer-sponsored heath coverage. See Congressional Budget Office, 
Testimony on CBO’s Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010 
(Washington, D.C: Mar. 30, 2011). The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the 
Actuary estimated that there would an increase of 2 million individuals with employer-sponsored 
coverage in 2014. Other studies estimate that employer offer rates may vary after PPACA is fully 
implemented in 2014 from a decrease of 0.3 percent to an increase of 8.4 percent.  
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offer coverage.52
• Small business tax credits: The tax credits may encourage small employers to 
offer coverage and reduce job lock. However, the tax credits may have little 
effect because they are temporary and of limited value.
  Other large employers that already offer coverage may 
choose to discontinue it and pay the penalty, especially if they find it less 
burdensome administratively to drop coverage or less costly to pay the 
penalty.  
53
• Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP Exchanges): The uncertainty 
that exists regarding implementation of these Exchanges makes it difficult to 
determine what effect they will have on small employer offer rates. Some 
experts pointed to mixed experience with similar small employer Exchanges 
currently existing in a limited number of states. On the other hand, if a 
substantial share of the small group market ultimately does provide health 
coverage through the SHOP Exchanges, then individuals could change jobs 
and maintain the same health plan, which could decrease job lock.  
  
• Individual mandate: Individuals may pressure their employers to provide 
coverage so that they can abide by the individual mandate requirement, 
resulting in an increase in employer offer rates. 
                     
52In 2011, almost all (99 percent) large employers offered health coverage, compared to 59 percent of 
small employers and 48 percent of the smallest employers (between 3 and 9 employees). See Kaiser 
Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits 2011 Annual 
Survey, (Menlo Park, Calif., and Chicago, Ill.: 2011).  
 
53According to the Treasury Inspector General of Tax Administration, as of mid-May 2011, 
approximately 228,000 taxpayers claimed this credit.   
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